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RECENT DECISIONS
of the Haverty decision. The principal case is judically and logically
sound, the Haverty Case is not., '
Under recent Congressional legislation, which has yet to meet the
test of constitutionality, a system of compensation is substituted for the
pre-existing rules and counter-rules. 14

WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - TRUSTS - PERPETUITIES. -Testator
died
leaving an estate of $150,000 to $200,000, and survived by his wife, a son
and a foster-daughter (who had never been adopted). By his will, he
gave the entire estate to a trustee in trust "from the income thereof to
pay monthly to our foster-daughter, Mabel Crans, so long as she may
live, the sum of fifty dollars ($50) per month for her personal use. The
balance of the income of my estate is to be paid to my wife, Ida L. Gallien, as she may desire it. Tf my said wife should be survived by our
son, Brace Goodwin Gallien, then the said balance of income or so much
thereof as may be necessary is to be expended for his proper support and
maintenance. * * * When the above payments shall cease by reason of
the deaths of the beneficiaries mentioned, I direct my said trustee to
pay the following bequests. * * * " The foster-daughter survived the
testator but four days. The Surrogate and the Appellate Division (by
a divided court) held the entire will void, the trust for the wife, son and
foster-daughter being deemed violative of statutory prohibitions against
the suspension of the power of alienation 1 and absolute ownership 2 for
more than two lives in being at the time of testator's death. Upon further appeal it was held: that under familiar canons of construction.:,

the power of the master * * *. One might as well bring within that class a

laborer employed by a contractor to repair a vessel in a drydock * * *. Such
a laborer is subject to the general maritime law. but not to the distinctive
features of that law which apply to seamen and no others. No one would
think of saying that his damages would be measured by maintenance, cure
and wages * * *. 'Words,' as we are told, 'are flexible.'"
12 See 1 St. John's L Rev. 76. "It is manifestly unsound to construe the
'Jones Act' as applying to stevedores and longshoremen. The whole tenor of
the act is for the protection of seamen and has no reference in any of its
provisions to other maritime employments. It is submitted that if Congress
intended to include other employments, it would not have restricted its language to 'seamen'."
13

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of Congress.

March 4, 1927. 1927 A. M. C. 525. 556.
1 N.

Y. Real Prop. L. § 42:

" * * * Every future estate shall be void in

its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation, by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continu-

ance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate.* * *"
2 N. Y. Pers. Prop. L. § 11 : "The absolute ownership of personal property
shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition, for a longer period than
during the continuance and until the termination of not more than two lives

in being. * * *"
3 Phillips v. Davies, 92 N. Y. 199 (1883) ; Roe z. Vingut, 117 N. Y. 204.

22 N. E. 933 (1889); Greene v.Greene, 125 N. Y. 506, 26 N. E. 739 '(1891).
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effect might be given to the will by eliminating entirely the provision
for the foster-daughter and declaring intestacy as to the sum required to
secure her income. Matter of Gallien, 247 N. Y. 195 (1928).
Distribution of the corpus of the trust was directed "when the above
payments shall cease by reason of the deaths of the beneficiaries mentioned." Obviously the question was as to the tifne of division-did the
will require that it be postponed until the deaths of all the beneficiaries,
or might it take place "when the payments severally cease and the deaths
severally occur." The latter result was obtained by interpreting the word
"when" at the beginning of the direction as equivalent to "as". The testator's sentence was reconstructed by the majority to read, "as the above
paym"ents shall cease (or shall severally cease) by reason of the deaths
of the beneficiaries mentioned, etc." "Internal evidences" of the testator's
intention induced the reconstruction. Upon the death of the wife and
son, the foster-'daughter surviving, the will, if literally construed, would
require the continuance of the trust of the entire estate to secure an
annual payment of but $600. Of more significance than this arguinent having its "roots in verbal criticism," is a consideration of the
consequences. The testator's wife and incompetent son were the primary
objects of his solicitude. Comparatively, the provision for the fostertdaughter was trifling. Her share would not be increased by the prior
deaths of both the wife and son. The death of the wife, the son surviving, would not call for distribution; he would without further act succeed
to his mother's interest. The Court avoided the consequence of holding
the will unlawful by "construing the cessatioi of payments as several
or distributive, rather than general or collective."
If the foster-daughter died, survived by the wife and son, her portion of the income would *goto swell the larger gift. Here was a possible
situation in which there would be a suspension for more than the permissible two lives in being. Necessarily the trust must fall unless the
invalid feature, the provision for the foster-daughter, be in some wise
separable. Indicia of the testator's intent supplied the need. As to the
sum which would produce the payments to the daughter, the testator died
intestate; the bulk of his estate passed subject to his wishes.
Judge Kellogg, dissenting, objected that the reconstructed sentence
wrought no improvement. He argued that under it. should the wife die
survived by the son, distribution would then be compulsory, leaving nothing in the trust for the son. It is believed, however, that the majority
did not offer the revised sentence in substitution for the pi-ovisions
establirhing the trust, but merely in lieu of the unhappily worded direction for division and distribution. The dissent is valuable as evidencing
the reaction of the "conservative" legal mind to the "common sense
appraisal" of the brilliant Chief Judge. Assuredly, the Court he heads
"struggles4 to preserve and surrenders to nothing short of obvious cnmpulsion."
4

247 N. Y. 195. 200, per Cardozo, C. J.

